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Abstract: Many philosophers have argued against Singer’s claim that all animals 
are equal.  However, none of these responses have demonstrated an 
appreciation of the complexity of his position.  The result is that all of these 
responses focus on one of his arguments in a way that falls victim to another.  
This paper is a critical examination of a possible response to the full complexity 
of Singer’s position that derives from the work of Carl Cohen, Kathleen Wilkes, 
and F. Ramsey.  On this response, a being’s moral status depends not on the 
capacities and abilities she does in fact have, but instead on the capacities and 
abilities normal for the members of her species.  However, this response is 
ultimately unacceptable, for it depends on a faulty conception of loss and 
misfortune and its underlying moral principle is irrational at best and morally 
objectionable at worst.  The failure of even this response to Singer gives us good 
reason to conclude with Singer that all animals are equal. 
 
Peter Singer has argued that “all animals are equal”.  Since then, many philosophers 
have attempted to spell out just where Singer has gone wrong, for it is clear to them that 
not all animals are, in fact, equal.  Indeed, only a little reflection on common sense 
should tell us that, as the title of an article written against Singer’s conclusion states, 
“some animals are more equal than others”.1  However, none of the responses to 
Singer have been able to rebut his arguments completely.  The problem is that most 
philosophers have misunderstood the overall structure of Singer’s position, resulting in 
responses to one of his arguments that fall victim to another.  This fact helps to explain 
why there is a continued interest in his work on the moral status of animals: while many 
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people think that there is something seriously wrong with his conclusions, no one has 
been able to clearly articulate where he has gone astray. 
 This paper will be an examination of a possible response to Singer’s arguments.  
On this response, an individual’s moral status depends not on the properties and 
abilities she actually possesses, but depends instead on the properties and abilities 
normal for her species.  The advantage of this response, if it were successful, is that it 
would address all of Singer’s arguments concerning the moral status of animals.  Since 
it is the only such response whose structure allows it to take the full complexity of his 
position into account, it has a distinct advantage over the other responses.  A further 
advantage of this response, if it were successful, is that it would provide a new and 
compelling account of the basis of human equality.  However, this response ultimately 
fails.  The failure of even this position, which takes the full complexity of Singer’s 
position into account, provides us with a good inductive reason to believe that Singer’s 
conclusion might be correct after all. 
1. Singer and PECI 
Most people believe that there is a fundamental moral difference between human 
beings and animals.  The best way to characterize this belief is as follows: although 
animals are worthy of our concern, they do not merit the kind of concern that human 
beings do.  Put another way, we could say that while both animals and human beings 
have direct moral status, only human beings deserve a full and equal moral status.2  
Let’s call this common view about the moral status of human beings and animals the 
Direct but Unequal (DBU) thesis. 
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 Singer argues that there is no good defense of the DBU thesis.3  He has two 
arguments for this conclusion.  The first is the Argument from Species Overlap (ASO).4  
The basic idea here is this: if there is a sharp moral divide between human beings and 
animals, then this must be due to the properties that human beings have and animals 
lack.  However, there are no properties that all and only human beings have that can 
ground such a moral difference.  More formally, the argument runs as follows:5
(1) In order to classify all and only human beings in moral category C 
there must be some property P that all and only human beings have 
that can ground such a classification. 
(2) Any such P that only human beings have is a property that some 
human beings will lack (i.e., infants, the senile, the severely cognitively 
disabled, etc.). 
(3) Any such P that all human beings have is a property that not only 
human beings will have (i.e., some animals will have it as well). 
(4) Therefore, there is no way to classify all and only human beings in 
moral category C. 
The essential insight behind the ASO is simply this: certain human beings and animals 
have similar abilities and capacities, and thus will be included or excluded from a moral 
category together as long as we assign moral standing on the basis of abilities and 
capacities.   
 The second argument Singer employs against the DBU thesis focuses on what is 
truly objectionable about such practices as racism and sexism.  It may be thought that 
these practices are objectionable because someone who favors the members of his 
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own race or sex is acting as if the members of his own race or sex are more intelligent, 
morally sensitive, etc., than the members of other races and sexes, when this is clearly 
not the case.  In other words, racism and sexism depend on the mistaken claim that 
human beings are not equal, when in fact all human beings are equal. 
 Singer rightly points out that this line of argument against racism or sexism is not 
very strong.  For it is obviously not true that all human beings are equal.  If we are to 
focus on any of the properties that are thought to be morally relevant and unique to 
human beings (e.g., rationality, moral capacity, ability to communicate with a language, 
etc.) we will find that some human beings have these properties to a greater extent than 
others.  This is a different point from the point made in the ASO, for the point made 
there was that some human beings lack these properties.  There may be a limited 
number of such human beings, however, and so this may be morally irrelevant.6  The 
point being made here is that these properties that are thought to be important are 
properties that admit of different degrees. 
 If intelligence (or rationality, etc.) really does carry the kind of moral weight it is 
commonly thought to carry, then racists and sexists have not been doing anything that 
is in principle wrong; rather, they have just been mistaken about certain facts.  A racist 
operates as if every member of his race were more intelligent, morally more sensitive, 
etc., than the members of another race when in fact that is not the case.  The racist is 
mistaken in thinking that these properties line up so neatly across races.  But if that is 
the only mistake that a racist or sexist is making, then he need not amend any of his 
moral principles.  He needs only to apply them in accordance with the facts.  Rather 
than being racists or sexists, he should instead be a “sophisticated inegalitarian”.  If 
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intelligence, rationality, moral sensitivity, etc., are really morally important and able to 
ground differences in moral standing then we should separate human beings not 
according to race, but rather according to their intelligence, rationality, etc.  We should 
claim that the interests of human beings with a very high IQ are to receive extra weight 
in moral deliberation because they are, e.g., smarter, and differences in intelligence can 
ground differences in moral standing. 
 This line of reasoning shows us that the racist is not objectionable because he 
assumes that members of other races are not as intelligent as the members of his own.7  
If that were the truly objectionable aspect of racism then the objectionable nature of 
racism stems from a factual error.  The sophisticated inegalitarian is not factually 
mistaken; however, he is just as objectionable as the racist.  Some other mistake is 
being made by both of these figures, and it is this mistake that is responsible for their 
objectionable natures. 
 Singer concludes that what is responsible for their objectionable natures is the 
fact that they assign concern to beings on the basis of morally irrelevant properties.  
The fact that a very intelligent person is very intelligent does not make his suffering or 
enjoyment any more morally special than the suffering or enjoyment of an individual that 
is less intelligent.  What is relevant here is not the intelligence of the person that is 
suffering or enjoying something, but is rather the suffering or the enjoyment itself. 
 Singer suggests that what this argument shows us is that the claim of human 
equality should not be understood as a factual claim at all, for as a factual claim it is 
patently false.  Rather, it is a normative claim that is characterized best with the 
Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests (PECI): 
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The essence of the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests is that we 
give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those 
affected by our actions.8
PECI instructs us to shift our attention away from such morally irrelevant considerations 
as the intelligence of the one that has an interest, and concentrate instead on the 
interest itself. 
 Once we have done this, we have no way of limiting that kind of equal concern to 
human beings.  The usual reason for attempting to do so is that human beings are more 
intelligent, rational, morally sensitive, etc., than animals, and so we need not consider 
their interests to be as important as ours.  But if the difference in intelligence between 
different human beings is not morally relevant, then why should it be relevant when 
comparing human beings and animals?  Either intelligence is able to ground different 
moral categories or else it is not.  The Sophisticated Inegalitarian Argument (SIA) above 
was meant to show us that intelligence cannot ground different moral categories; we 
cannot now claim that it can and remain consistent.  The result is that the basis of 
human equality, namely PECI, extends to animals as well.  There is no defensible way 
to mark off separate moral categories for human beings and animals. 
2. Partial Responses to Singer 
Those that respond to Singer’s position typically respond to only one of his two 
arguments.  The result is that these responses fall victim to the other argument.  
Demonstrating this with a few examples will help us both to appreciate that an adequate 
response has yet to be developed and to understand the complexity of Singer’s position 
better. 
Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 7
 For example, some philosophers have argued that the number of human beings 
who have abilities and capacities similar to animals is very limited, and that this should 
us cause us to reject the ASO.  The fact that there are a limited number of such human 
beings might support this conclusion in one of two ways.  First, it might be thought that 
morality is meant to cover cases that we encounter in the actual world and is not meant 
to cover exceptional or rare cases.9  The failure of our moral system to capture these 
human beings should not be seen as a failure of our system itself, but rather as a kind 
of necessary limitation.  Second, some philosophers claim that the only thing the ASO 
demonstrates is that not all human beings are equal.  The fact that there are very few 
human beings with abilities and capacities similar to those of animals is taken as a 
means to soften this blow for us: people like Singer tend to exaggerate the number of 
these human beings by using terms such as “cognitively impaired human beings”, which 
misleads us into thinking that people with Down’s Syndrome fall into this category.  
However, the only human beings that should be counted here are those infants who are 
born with severe cognitive impairments that do not allow them to develop in any 
significant way.  Since there are so few human beings in this condition, there is nothing 
wrong with concluding that not all human beings are equal. 
 It is questionable whether these responses to the ASO are successful.  However, 
it is not necessary to make such a determination here.  Even if these responses 
successfully rebut the ASO, the resulting position can do nothing to respond to the SIA.  
In fact, the reasoning used falls prey to the reasoning of the SIA.  On this response, 
these human beings are not equal because they are not as intelligent, rational, morally 
sensitive, etc. as normal adult human beings.  It has been assumed, therefore, that 
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these are morally relevant properties.  If they are morally relevant properties then the 
sophisticated inegalitarian is on secure footing.  The lesson to be learned is this: in 
order to refute one of Singer’s arguments, we must respond with reasoning that does 
not fall prey to the other.  This response to the ASO does not take this complexity into 
account, and therefore is bound to fail. 
 Another common strategy used against Singer is to rebut the SIA.  For example, 
some philosophers claim that what makes human beings distinctive is that they have 
achieved a certain level of rationality, intelligence, moral sensitivity, etc.  On this 
response, the distinctive properties of human beings are emergent properties—they 
come into existence once a being is intelligent enough, rational enough, morally 
sensitive enough, but further advances of rationality, intelligence, etc., do not give one 
more of what makes human beings distinctive.10
 Once again, it is an open question whether this response is acceptable.  Whether 
it is or not does not matter at this point, for it does nothing to respond to the ASO.  In 
fact, the reasoning used here falls prey to the reasoning of the ASO: if we attain full and 
equal moral status only when we are intelligent enough, then the human beings who 
never become rational or intelligent enough will not have full and equal moral status.  
We have seen once again that partial responses to Singer’s position will not work: what 
is needed is a response that is able to handle both of his arguments at once.  Unless 
such a response can be developed, we have no reason to reject his conclusion. 
3. The Species-Norm Account of Moral Status 
This section will outline a theory of moral status that might be able to support the DBU 
thesis, which originates with the work of Carl Cohen11, and has been extensively 
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furthered and defended by Kathleen Wilkes12 and H. Ramsey.13  This response also 
appears to capture many common-sense beliefs that are widely held by people 
concerning the value and moral status of cognitively impaired human beings.  It is 
therefore worthwhile to determine whether the account is defensible. 
 The account has two parts.  First, it is claimed that there is a way that the 
members of our species should be.  Two of the properties human beings should have 
are the ability to act morally and to be autonomous.14  Ramsey in particular focuses on 
these two properties as constituting the distinctive value of the members of our species.  
However, if this is all there is to the proposal it would run headlong into the ASO, for 
these two properties that are claimed to confer value upon us are properties that not all 
human beings possess.  The second part of the proposal allows Wilkes and Ramsey to 
provide an intriguing and original response to Singer’s arguments.  Both Wilkes and 
Ramsey claim that all human beings, even those that lack the distinctive properties, are 
equally valuable precisely because they are the sorts of beings that should have these 
value-conferring properties.  Thus, the moral status of a being is determined not by the 
properties and abilities she does in fact have, but is instead determined by the 
properties and abilities that are normal for her species, and thus are the properties and 
abilities she should have.  Let us call the conjunction of these two claims the Species-
Norm Account of Moral Status (SNAMS). 
 Before we consider this proposal in more detail, it is worth noting how it allows us 
to respond to both the ASO and the SIA.  First, if we compare a human being that is 
cognitively impaired with a normal cow, for instance, we may find that they both have 
similar abilities and capacities.  However, if SNAMS is correct, then the moral status of 
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the human being is stronger than the moral status of the normal cow.  Although the 
human being does not have the abilities and capacities normal for her species, she 
should have them; thus, since she is the kind of being that should have those abilities 
and capacities, she should have the same moral status as any other human being.  The 
cow, on the other hand, is not unfortunate for having the level of intelligence it has, and 
so does not deserve any kind of compensation for being in the state in which it exists.  
The cow’s moral status will depend on the abilities and capacities that are normal for its 
species, and since autonomy and moral capacity are not normal for cows, the cow will 
not deserve a full and equal moral status.  We thus have a response to the ASO: there 
is one property that all human beings have, that no animals have, and that can ground a 
unique moral status.  That property is the property of being a member of a species 
whose members should be autonomous and able to act morally. 
 SNAMS is also able to respond to the SIA.  If what grounds an individual’s moral 
status are the capacities and abilities normal for the members of her species, then it will 
follow that every member of our species will have the same moral status.  The reason 
for this is simple: what is normal for our species does not vary from individual to 
individual.  Since that which grounds the moral status of every human being is just one 
property common to us all, it follows that we all have the exact same moral status.  
Thus, this account, if defensible, will provide a new and compelling account of human 
equality. 
 Another advantage of this proposal is that it is not overly anthropocentric.  For 
what is morally special about all human beings is not the mere fact that we are human, 
but rather that we are members of a species whose members should be autonomous 
Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 11
and able to act morally.  This is a property that the members of other species can have 
as well, and so we can conclude that any intelligent aliens that we meet (if any) should 
be given the same moral status that we have. 
 However, before we can rest content with this account of moral status, we must 
first determine if there are compelling reasons to accept it.  It is comprised of two 
claims, each of which need to defended, for both are controversial.  Recall that these 
two claims are as follows: first, there is a way that members of our species should be; 
second, the moral status of a being depends on the properties and abilities it should 
have.  In this section attention will be focused on the first claim, while a critical 
examination of the second claim will wait for the remaining sections. 
 Both Wilkes and Ramsey insist that we cannot use a statistical notion of what is 
normal for the members of our species and instead rely on an Aristotelian 
understanding of the first claim.  Wilkes writes: 
The ‘Aristotelian Principle’, broadly, claims that every creature strives after 
its own perfection, and thus that any member of kind K which is not a 
perfect instance of kind K is something to be pitied or deplored.15
Wilkes maintains that any being that falls short of the potential it should reach given that 
it is the kind of being it is has suffered an Aristotelian loss. 
 However, there are problems with using an Aristotelian understanding of the first 
claim.  Recall that Aristotle divides living beings into three kinds: the (merely) living, the 
function of which is to take in nutrition and grow, the (merely) sentient, the function of 
which is to have sense-perception, and finally the rational, the function of which is to 
guide their conduct with reason.  Each of these three kinds of beings are constituted by 
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matter that is given its particular form by its soul (this is the hylomorphic account of the 
soul).16  If this is right, then a being that is not rational is not, on the Aristotelian account, 
of the same kind as we are.  Rather, it will be either merely sentient or merely alive, 
depending on the abilities and capacities it does in fact have. 
 It should be noted that this is not just an outdated relic of Aristotelian philosophy.  
Modern Aristotelians, such as Martha Nussbaum, argue that in order to be a human 
being, one must have certain properties and capacities, including rationality, moral 
capacity, and autonomy.17  For Nussbaum, then, if an infant had severe enough 
cognitive disabilities, it would not count as a human being at all.  This is not just a 
terminological point: for both Aristotle and Nussbaum, lacking certain essential 
properties makes an individual, even if it has human DNA, of a different moral category 
all together.  This understanding of the first claim, then, will not allow Wilkes and 
Ramsey to argue that all human beings, including severely cognitively disabled infants, 
should be a certain way and should therefore have a full and equal moral status, for this 
interpretation explicitly denies that claim. 
 Perhaps we could use something similar to Ruth Millikan’s notion of “proper 
function” to defend the claim that there is a way that all human beings should be.18  
According to Millikan, the proper function of a thing is determined by the historical-
causal history of that thing.  The sorts of things with proper functions are organs, 
artifacts, reasoned behaviors, learned behaviors, customs, and such intentional items 
as language, meanings, and beliefs.  According to Millikan: 
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A proper function of such an organ or behavior is, roughly, a function that 
its ancestors have performed that has helped account for proliferation of 
the genes responsible for it, hence helped account for its own existence.19
This is a decidedly anti-statistical notion of proper function, for what matters on this 
account is not how certain things are in fact put to use; rather, what matters in 
determining a proper function of a thing is the historical-causal chain leading up to its 
existence.  The function of a heart would be to pump blood even if almost every human 
being on the planet had a faulty heart that could not in fact pump blood.  The function of 
the heart is to pump blood because the reason hearts continue to be reproduced is due 
in part to the fact that they pump blood; it is the fact that the reproduction of hearts in 
future generations requires that normal hearts pump blood that gives the heart the 
function of pumping blood. 
 Perhaps we can apply this account of normal function to defend the claim that 
there is a way that human beings should be.  Recall that the two abilities that make 
human beings distinctively valuable are autonomy and the ability to act morally.  A 
plausible case can be made for the claim that the function of the upper hemispheres of 
the human brain is to allow us to be autonomous and act morally.  If we could defend 
this, then we could make sense of the claim that there is a way that every human being 
should be; the way every human being should be is determined by the function of our 
organs, especially the brain, and the function of those organs is determined by the 
historical-causal history that is responsible for their reproduction.  If we could 
successfully argue that acting morally and being autonomous are partly responsible for 
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the reproduction of human beings, then we might just have a way of explicating the first 
claim in a thorough manner. 
 Whether this project can be successfully completed is not of concern here.  This 
option has been discussed only because the defense of the first claim offered by Wilkes 
and Ramsey appeared to be in conflict with their overall conclusion, and so until such 
an alternative proposal was made, it was not clear if this account of moral status could 
even get off the ground.  Let us therefore assume, for the sake of argument, that the 
above explication of the way human beings should be is tenable.  Let us now turn our 
attention to the second claim. 
 Why should an individual’s moral status be determined by the abilities and 
capacities she should have rather than by the abilities and capacities she does in fact 
have?  According to Ramsey, a being that does not have the abilities and capacities she 
ought to have has suffered a misfortune, and the unfortunate deserve compensation.  
He writes: 
To claim that the handicapped ought to be compensated implies that we 
believe we owe them something which is not owed to animals with similar 
capacities or attainments to handicapped people.  This is to claim that a 
handicapped human life is of greater value than the life of a healthy non-
human animal.  The reason we believe this is because we recognize that 
a healthy non-human animal has suffered no loss by being an animal.20
Wilkes makes a similar point.  In discussing a cognitively impaired infant who is of the 
same mental capacity as a chimpanzee, she writes: 
Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 15
The interests (present and future) we can ascribe [to the infant] are, like 
the interests of any sentient creature, interests that demand respect and 
support—ceteris, as always, paribus.  In this respect they demand the 
respect and support that the interests of a non-human animal at the same 
level demand.  However, again there is more to it than that; there is also 
the same decisive difference...between the impaired infant and the 
chimpanzee, even when both were at approximately the same mental 
level: the infant, but not the chimpanzee, has suffered an Aristotelian 
tragedy.21
Both Wilkes and Ramsey take our attitude of pity and the belief that the humans are 
quite unfortunate to constitute evidence for the claim that the humans are of greater 
worth, even though they lack the properties that confer value to the members of our 
species.  Other than this evidential claim, neither provides compelling arguments for the 
second claim of the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status.22
 In the remaining sections it will be demonstrated that this second claim must be 
rejected.  It will be shown in the next section that both Wilkes and Ramsey are using an 
account of misfortune that has been successfully refuted by the work of Jeff McMahan.  
In the sections following that, it will be argued that even if this account of misfortune 
were defensible, we have good reason to think that a being’s moral status does not 
depend on the abilities and capacities normal for her species.  In fact, the second claim 
falls prey to slightly modified versions of Singer’s arguments.  Since this alternative 
account of the basis of moral status was so appealing because it was considered 
capable of refuting these arguments, it will have nothing to speak for it. 
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4. The Species-Norm Account of Misfortune 
On the proposal we are considering, the reason that a being with abilities and capacities 
that fall below those normal for her species should have the same moral status as the 
other members of her species is because she has suffered a loss.  This loss has made 
here unfortunate, and so she deserves some kind of compensation for that loss.  A 
necessary condition of defending this proposal, then, is defending the claim that a being 
whose abilities and capacities that fall below those normal for her species has suffered 
a loss and is unfortunate.  However, recent work by Jeff McMahan23 suggests that 
having abilities and capacities that fall below normal is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for suffering a loss and being unfortunate. 
 To see that it is not necessary, McMahan asks us to imagine the following 
situation, which he labels The Superchimp: 
A newborn chimpanzee is administered a form of gene therapy that 
causes its brain to continue to develop in ways that parallel the 
development of the human brain.  As a consequence, this chimpanzee, as 
an adult, comes to have cognitive and emotional capacities comparable to 
those of a ten-year-old human child.  After some years of exercising these 
capacities, however, this Superchimp suffers brain damage that reduces 
him to the psychological level of a normal chimpanzee, after which he 
lives a contented life among other chimpanzees, with a mental life 
indistinguishable from that of a normal chimpanzee.24
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If being unfortunate required that a being have abilities and capacities that fall below 
those normal for his species, then we would be forced to conclude that Superchimp is 
not unfortunate as a result of the loss of his cognitive powers. 
 McMahan rightly points out that there is something wrong with this conclusion.  In 
Wilkes’s quotation above, she claims that the loss of a comparable amount of mental 
abilities and capacities would constitute a tragedy if it occurred to a ten-year-old human 
child.  There is no good reason to deny that this is true of Superchimp as well.  He once 
had abilities and capacities that far surpassed the ones he has now but lost them, and 
that is a great misfortune for him.  It does not matter that he is now as intelligent as 
normal chimpanzees. 
 To see that falling below the level normal for your species is not sufficient for 
suffering a loss, McMahan asks us to consider the following example.25  Suppose that 
chimpanzees become an endangered species.  Suppose, further, that the changes in 
Superchimp are inheritable, and that Superchimp fathers many of the chimpanzees 
remaining in the world.  If there were enough chimpanzees produced as a result of this, 
each of which has heightened mental capacities and abilities, then the Species-Norm 
Account of Misfortune would imply that those chimpanzees that do not have these 
greater mental abilities are very unfortunate.  Once again, however, this does not seem 
to be the right thing to say.  The fact that some chimpanzees are more intelligent does 
not seem make the other chimpanzees worse off then they were before: they are living 
lives that are going as well as possible given their abilities and capacities, and so it is 
hard to see just how they are unfortunate. 
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 McMahan suggests that the proper way to determine whether a being is 
unfortunate is by determining how close that individual is to achieving its full potential 
given its physical make-up.  Superchimp, then, has suffered a loss and is unfortunate 
on this account because Superchimp has a genetic make-up that should allow him to 
have greater abilities than he does in fact have.  Furthermore, normal chimpanzees 
would not have suffered a loss even if most other chimpanzees had heightened 
capacities, and this is due to the fact that the normal chimpanzees are not falling short 
of their potential. 
 If we apply this theory to human beings, the result is that infants born with certain 
severe cognitive defects have not suffered a loss and are not unfortunate.  The reason 
they have not suffered a loss is that they are not falling short of their potential: given 
their physical make-up and genes, they have the abilities and capacities we should 
expect them to have.  If this theory is correct, then, we cannot claim that all human 
beings that fall short of the abilities and capacities normal for our species have suffered 
a loss and are unfortunate. 
5. The Son of Superchimp 
However, let us put the above objection to the side.  Perhaps a defender of the Species-
Norm Account of Moral Status could save the Species-Norm Account of Misfortune from 
these objections.  Even if he could, his overall position is still untenable.  In this section 
a slightly modified version of the Superchimp example will be presented as a first 
attempt to argue against the claim that a being’s moral status should depend on the 
abilities and capacities normal for her species. 
 Consider The Son of Superchimp: 
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The alterations of Superchimp’s DNA affect his germ cells, and so his 
heightened cognitive capacities are inheritable.  Superchimp becomes the 
proud father of Son of Superchimp (SOS).  Like his father, SOS has the 
cognitive capacities of a normal ten-year-old-human child. 
Now if a being’s moral status depends not on the abilities and capacities he does in fact 
have, but depends instead on the abilities and capacities normal for the members of his 
species, it would follow that SOS has the moral status of a normal chimpanzee.  If we 
also suppose, as both Wilkes and Ramsey apparently do, that a chimpanzee will have a 
moral status that is far weaker than that of a normal ten-year-old child, it will follow that 
SOS has a moral status that is far below that of a normal ten-year-old child. 
 The implications of this view are clearly unacceptable.  Suppose that scientists 
are hoping to find good candidates to be experimental subjects.  When they learn of 
SOS, they are thrilled.  Here is a being that can respond articulately to the questions 
asked of him, can describe the different sorts of sensations the medicines tested on him 
cause him to have, and yet at the same time has a diminished moral status and so can 
be used at the scientists’ will, without giving consent and against his wishes.  The 
proposal is clearly shocking.  It would not do SOS much good to explain to him that 
although he is very smart, most chimpanzees are not, and so he does not have a strong 
moral status.  He would rightly complain that the abilities and capacities of other 
chimpanzees are hardly relevant to his moral status.  What matters are the abilities and 
capacities he does in fact have. 
 Perhaps we can respond to this objection by adopting an asymmetrical version of 
the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status.  On this suggestion, a being whose abilities 
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and capacities fall below what is normal for the members of her species will have the 
same moral status as the members of her species, while a being whose abilities and 
capacities fall above those normal for the members of her species will have an elevated 
moral status.  Thus, SOS will have a moral status that depends on the abilities he in fact 
does have, and since he is rational, autonomous, and able to act morally, he should 
receive the same moral status that normal ten-year-old children have, namely, a full and 
equal moral status.  Normal chimpanzees, on the other hand, will have a moral status 
appropriate for the members of their species. 
 There are two serious problems for the proposed response.  First, it is an entirely 
ad hoc move.  The only reason to alter the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status in the 
proposed way is because we are convinced that SOS’s moral status is greater than that 
of a normal chimpanzee.  We think that SOS’s moral status depends on the abilities and 
capacities he does in fact have rather than those normal for his species.  The attempt to 
save the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status by introducing the asymmetry results in 
a very unstable theory: a person who does this is claiming that a being’s moral status 
depends on the abilities normal for her species, and then denies that very claim when 
confronted with SOS. 
 Suppose we allow the ad hoc suggestion and adopt the asymmetrical version of 
the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status.  If we do then another, and more serious, 
problem arises.  If beings that have capacities and abilities far above those normal for 
the members of their species have an elevated moral status, then we can now become 
sophisticated inegalitarians again.  Armed with this response, why can’t an especially 
gifted human being claim that since he is smarter, more autonomous, and morally more 
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capable than most other human beings, he should have an elevated moral status?  It 
would appear that the asymmetrical version of the Species-Norm Account of Moral 
Status must claim that such a person would have an elevated moral status, thus 
conflicting with the claim that all human beings are equal. 
 So we have one compelling reason to conclude that an individual’s moral status 
does not depend on the abilities and capacities normal for her species.  If we did assign 
moral status in this way, SOS would have a reduced moral status, which is absurd.  The 
only way to modify the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status so that it implies that 
SOS has the moral status we think he does have would also imply that not all human 
beings are equal. 
6. Alternative Classificatory Schemes 
An examination of the underlying structure of Species-Norm Account of Moral Status 
can generate another argument against it.  Its structure can be represented as follows: 
The moral status of a being, A, depends on the properties and abilities 
that are normal for the members of biological category, BC, of which A is a 
member. 
Many people find this classificatory scheme quite plausible when species membership 
is used for BC.  Would it be equally plausible if we were to use some other values for 
BC?  By replacing BC with gender we would have the Gender-Norm Account of Moral 
Status, by using race for BC we would have the Racial-Norm Account of Moral Status, 
and by using genetic make-up we would have the Genetic-Norm Account of Moral 
Status.  Would any of these be equally acceptable? 
Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 22
 One apparent reason to answer this in the affirmative is as follows.  Since there 
are no significant differences between the abilities that are normal for different races or 
genders, there would be no difference between using the Species-Norm Account of 
Moral Status and either the Gender-Norm or Racial-Norm Accounts.  What is normal for 
our species does not vary enough for either of these accounts to be any different than 
the Species-Norm Account, and so these accounts will have the exact same practical 
import as the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status. 
 However, there is a problem with this response.  There tend to be statistically 
significant differences between the performance of different genders and races on 
standardized tests.  There are, of course, two possible explanations for these 
differences.  One is that the tests, educational system, or society in general (or all of the 
above) are biased, and that this bias favors certain individuals over others on these 
tests.  The other is that the differences are somehow due to the genetic differences 
between the sexes and races.  As explanations of the different scores on these tests, 
neither option can be ruled out completely.  The claim that the Gender-Norm or Racial-
Norm Accounts of Moral Status are not objectionable, however, depends on the first 
explanation being correct and the second incorrect. 
 Now some people may not find this to be a bad thing, for they are convinced that 
the first explanation is correct and the second is incorrect.  They may be right about 
that; however, their commitment to the equality of all human beings seems to be rather 
tenuous.  They would have to wait until the final verdict was in before they could be sure 
that all human beings are in fact equal.  A stronger commitment to the equality of 
human beings would not have to wait for such a verdict—someone who is strongly 
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committed to the equality of all human beings would claim that, even if the different 
scores on the tests were due to genetic rather than societal differences between the 
races and sexes, this does nothing to undermine the claim that all human beings are 
equal. 
 Another problem arises if we consider the Genetic-Norm Account of Moral 
Status.  Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that some people with extremely high 
IQs are as intelligent as they are due to genetic influences, and that some people with 
extremely low IQs have their level of intelligence due to genetic influences as well.  We 
could claim that people with an extremely high IQ comprise a distinct kind of being, and 
those with an extremely low IQ comprise another distinct biological category as well.  
There is no question whether the resulting view is objectionable, for it clearly is.  This 
argument is just a slightly modified version of the SIA.  Whether the Gender-Norm or 
Racial-Norm Accounts of Moral Status are objectionable may seem to depend on 
certain facts, so we simply develop another account where the facts are not in question 
and the resulting moral view is clearly unacceptable. 
 So it would seem that not every value for BC can be used in the above schema 
to result in an acceptable account of moral status.  Is this due to something 
objectionable about the schema itself, or is it rather that there is something 
objectionable about using something other than species membership as the value for 
BC?  The defender of the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status must of course argue 
that there is nothing objectionable about the schema, for it is the one he uses, but that 
there must be something wrong with using anything other than species membership.  
Can such an argument be found? 
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 One tempting reply is to claim that while species membership is clearly morally 
relevant, it is equally clear that race, gender, and genetic make-up are not morally 
relevant at all.  This is hardly satisfying.  We are in the midst a debate concerning the 
moral status of human beings and animals, in an attempt to determine whether human 
beings with abilities and capacities comparable to those of animals will nonetheless 
have a stronger moral status than the animals.  It cannot be claimed at this point that 
species is morally relevant while sex, race, and genetic make-up are not.  The account 
of moral status being discussed is supposed to show us why being a member of our 
species gives us a strong moral status, and so it is quite illegitimate to use as a premise 
the very conclusion for which the argument is aiming. 
 Perhaps a defender of the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status could offer an 
argument along contractarian lines for claiming that species membership is, while race, 
gender, and genetic make-up are not morally relevant.  Peter Carruthers has attempted 
to do just this in an influential and sustained work on the moral status of animals.26  
However, it is not clear that contractualists can adequately meet the challenge of the 
ASO.27  Even if such a defense could be offered, it would do nothing to help the 
supporter of the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status.  For in relying on a 
contractualist theory of morality, he will have abandoned his theory of moral status 
altogether.  In other words, if a contractualist theory of morality can be used to support 
the claim that species membership is, while race, gender, and genetic make-up are not, 
morally relevant, then the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status is completely 
superfluous.  A good defense of contractualist theories of morality might be able to 
support the DBU thesis (but that is a highly controversial assumption), but it will not help 
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in supporting the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status.  Similar points apply to any 
attempt along utilitarian or Kantian lines to support the claim that species membership is 
relevant while gender, race, and genetic make-up are not. 
 The defender of the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status cannot defend the 
claim that the objectionable nature of the Gender-Norm, Racial-Norm, or Genetic-Norm 
Accounts of Moral Status is the reliance on something other than species membership 
rather than the underlying structure of the view.  We can now see the theory for what it 
really is.  The theory has been developed to help provide theoretical support for an 
intuition that many people have.  However, the theoretical support offered is nothing 
more than a restatement of the intuition that is in need of support.  It is claimed that a 
being’s moral status should depend on the species of the being, thus assuming that 
species membership is morally relevant.  That is exactly what is in need of proof, and 
cannot be used to support itself.  At the very least, then, we have no reason to accept 
the Species-Norm Account of Moral Status. 
 We may very well have reason to reject it as well.  At this point it seems 
reasonable to conclude that it is the structure of the Species-Norm Account of Moral 
Status itself that is objectionable.  This is a simpler explanation of what is wrong with the 
Gender-Norm, Racial-Norm, and Genetic-Norm Accounts of Moral Status, and it allows 
us to see clearly what has gone wrong with the Son of Superchimp example as well.  
There is something essentially arbitrary in assigning moral status to a being on the 
basis of abilities and capacities he does not have.  How we should treat someone 
should depend on the interests that being has, not on the biological category to which 
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he happens to belong.  Anything else is irrational at best, and morally objectionable at 
worst. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that Singer’s position is more complex than most people assume.  The 
most common responses to Singer have demonstrated this in that they fall victim to his 
overall argument strategy.  The Species-Norm Account of Moral Status seemed to have 
the resources necessary to refute all of Singer’s arguments.  However, it is an 
untenable position.  First, it relies on a notion of loss and misfortune that is unsupported 
and leads to counter-intuitive results.  Second, the moral principle on which it is founded 
is equally unacceptable.  Although this response has the right structure to meet Singer’s 
challenge, it is still incapable of finally refuting his argument.  This gives us at least 
some inductive support for Singer’s conclusion, and until a better argument against it is 
made, we should tentatively agree with Singer that all animals are equal.28
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